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ABSTRACT
Insurance and Self-protection for Increased Risk Aversion
by
ZHANG Jian
Master of Philosophy
We re-examine the classic problem of risk aversion and self-protection in this
paper. In the beginning of this paper, we conduct comparative statics of risk
aversion and prevention efforts based on the mono-periodic two states model of
choice under risk. We show this new condition is effective with self-insurance-
cum-protection model (Lee, 1998), in which the decision maker’s activities to
prevent the risk can sever both as self-insurance and self-protection. We suggest
a new condition that increased risk aversion induces more prevention activities.
This new condition requires only one assumption concerning fear of ruin coeffi-
cient, marginal effect of SICP activity on probability and marginal cost of SICP
activity. By applying interval dominance order (Quah and Strulovici,2009), we
find that a decision maker will exert higher level of SICP activity if he becomes
more risk averse, under the condition that his hazard rate is higher than the
’boldness’ coefficient (Aumann and Kurz,1977). This new condition is effective
even when the optimal level for SICP activity is not interior solution. With our
method, the assumption,that optimal solution is interior,is not necessary and
marginal utility functions do not need to be monotonic on the interval [0, w0].
Based on this, the optimal solution can be corner solution or inflection point so-
lution. And the DM’s attitude towards risk can be variable. Hence, the relation
suggested by our findings is more consistent with real world situations.
Key words: Risk aversion, Self-protection, Insurance, Interval dominance order
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Research Background
In the past 40 years, economics of risk and insurance begun to flourish in
three main areas: optimal insurance and protection, market equilibrium under
asymmetric information and insurance market structure. In the theory of risk
management, insurance and prevention are among the tools available to manage
risk. The goal for risk management is to find optimal effort for risk prevention
or insurance activities. In order to mitigate risks, individuals may take actions
either reducing the severity of potential loss(self-insurance or loss reduction)or
reducing the probability of occurrence of a risk(self-protection or loss preven-
tion). It is intuitive that people would take more efforts to reduce risk when
they become more averse to take risk.
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) are the first to study the demand of self-insurance
and self-protection 1and their study focuses on the interaction between market
insurance, self-insurance and self-protection. This paper is regarded as first
article on theory of risk management. Another classic paper on self-insurance
and self-protection is by Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985). They show that a more
risk averse decision maker would take higher self-insurance activities, while this
more risk averse decision maker’s choice on self-protection is ambiguous. After
Dionne and Eeckhoudt’s paper, a number of later research try to clarify the link
between risk aversion and self-protection. Boyer and Dionne (1989) study the
relation between increased exogenous risk and self-protection actions, but they
1They are the first to use the terms self-insurance and self-protection.
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find that impact on the self-protection activities by increased risk is ambiguous.
Briys and Schlesinger(1990) prove that the relation between risk aversion and
self-insurance are still robust in several distinct settings, while the relation for
self-protection and risk aversion cannot hold in these settings. Jullien and et al.
(1999) suggest a utility-dependent threshold of probability, beneath which more
self-protection is the result of increased risk aversion. Chiu(2000) analyzes the
effect of prudence on this threshold. Eeckhoudt and Gollier(2005) propose some
assumptions under which a risk-neutral agent invests less in self-protection than
a prudent agent.
Interestingly, scholars used first order condition to conduct comparative
statics of risk aversion and prevention efforts in these studies. A major limita-
tion is these results require some technical assumptions of second order condi-
tions for utility function2. Methods of monotonic comparative statics can help
us gain some results with less assumptions. For example, single crossing con-
dition(Milgrom and Shannon,1994) and interval dominance order (Quah and
Strulovici,2009) enables one to better analyze this comparative statics problem
of risk aversion and self protection with less assumptions regarding the second
order conditions for utility function. By applying single crossing condition and
interval dominance order, we show the positive relationship between increased
risk aversion and self-insurance is still effective without second order assump-
tions. And we suggest under a new condition increased risk aversion increases
SICP efforts.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In next section, we introduce
2for example, concave of utility function
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a brief review of literature, which concerns self-insurance, self-protection,single
crossing condition and interval dominance order. Chapter 2 provides settings of
the model and derives our condition for higher protection under increased risk
aversion. Chapter 3 concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
Prior studies have found that increased risk aversion induces more self-
insurance activities when DMs are risk averse, while this relation is ambigu-
ous for increased risk-aversion and self-protection activities. Under some as-
sumptions about utility function and initial probability of loss, increased self-
protection activity is the reaction to increased risk aversion.
In this section, I first briefly review the literature on self-insurance and self-
protection. I will then review the existing studies on monotonic comparative
statics, which is our main method to reach conclusions in this paper.
1.2.1 Self-insurance and Self-protection
In the first place, we will summarize the literature on risk aversion and
prevention efforts. Prevention can be understood as the efforts to avoid the risk
or, at least, to reduce the losses caused by this risk. Compared with precaution,
prevention is a static concept while precaution is a dynamic concept with varying
information available over time. Two major types of prevention effort are self-
insurance and self-protection.
Self-insurance refers to the activity that aims to reduce the severity of loss
3
when risk occurs at the cost of lower wealth in all states. While self-protection is
the activity to lower the probability of loss occurs. Self-insurance offers a channel
to transfer the wealth from states where marginal utility of wealth is lower to
where it is higher, while self-protection only increases the probability of higher
utility state at the expense of reducing wealth in all states. Risk preferences
is the decision maker’s attitude towards uncertainty about his wealth. There
are three types of risk preference:risk-loving, risk-neutral and risk averse. If an
agent dislikes every lottery with an expected payoff of zero, even at any level
of wealth, then this agent is risk-averse. The absolute value of risk-aversion is
indicated by the inverse for quotient of second order derivative of utility function
to first order derivative of utility function (−u′′
u
′ ). This has been developed by
Arrow(1963) and Pratt(1964) independently in 1960’s.
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) are the first to study the demand of self-insurance
and self protection. Their study examines the interaction between market in-
surance and prevention efforts. Their findings are mainly three-fold:
First, when no market insurance is available, the risk-averse decision maker
will engage in self-insurance and self-protection activities. The optimal level of
these prevention actions depends on the cost and complete elimination of the
risk is generally not optimal.
Second, market insurance and self-insurance are substitute. The increased
amount of protection from the insurer induces a rational decision maker to re-
duces his investment into self-insurance. However it is widely believed that this
effect of market insurance may lead to ’moral hazard’. They show that, under
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some conditions, the market insurance may lead to a decrease in the probability
of hazardous events.
Third, self-protection and market insurance may be complement or sub-
stitute depending on the sensitivity of the insurance premium to the effect of
self-protection.
After this paper, increasing number of important contributions concerning
prevention efforts and risk aversion are made. A decade later, Dionne and Eeck-
houdt (1985) show that increased risk aversion for a decision maker results in
higher self-insurance activities, while this relation is not valid for self-protection.
They are the first to conduct comparative statics of risk aversion and prevention
efforts and first to suggest the ambiguous effect of increased risk aversion on
self-protection. They think the key for a clear relation between self-protection
and increased risk aversion is the value of transformation for more risk averse
agent’s utility function.
In Boyers and Dionne s’ (1989) paper, they study the relation between
increased exogenous risk and self-protection activities and suggest that high-
er risk has an ambiguous impact on the self-protection activities. If decision
maker’s utility functions are non-DARA, they will spend more in self-protection
as the reaction to increased risk. They also note that self-insurance leads to
larger changes in distribution of risk than self-protection does. This idea links
self-insurance and self-protections activities to the first order stochastic improve-
ment of utility.
Briys and Schlesinger(1990) prove that the relation between risk aversion
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and self-insurance are still robust in several distinct settings, such as state-
dependent utility, the presence of background and random initial wealth, while
the relation for self-protection still cannot hold under these settings.
Briys, Schlesinger and Schuenburs(1991) study the relation between market
insurance, self-insurance and self-protection if the reliability is not guaranteed.
As a result, some original relations do not hold, such as the inductive relation be-
tween higher risk and higher self-insurance and the substitute relation of market
insurance and self-insurance. Additionally, no definite result for self-protection
is reached in this study.
Sweeney and Beard(1992) focus on the comparative statics of self-protection
solely and investigate the effects of altered probability of loss and loss sizes on
optimal self-protection. They find the effect of loss size and loss probability have
mixed effect on self-protection, and thresholds for these two cases both relates
to absolute risk aversion function.
Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (1999) analyze the effect of prevention effort-
s on distribution of loss. They examine the effect of self-insurance and self-
protection from the perspective of distribution of loss. They conclude that a
more risk averse agent always chooses a higher-level of self-insurance and efforts
in self-protection would be higher for more risk-averse under the condition that
the initial loss probability is low enough. This condition is really helpful in un-
derstanding the relation between risk-aversion and self-protection since it links
the probability of loss and protection efforts. Moreover they extend this result
to a general type of probability and find it effective in general type model.
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Chiu(2000) studies individual’s propensity to self-protect and concludes
that both marginal and average propensity to self-protect is in relation to the
initial loss probability and degree of risk aversion. He also finds the average
propensity to self-protect is decreasing with the initial loss probability, and the
same is true for the marginal propensity under a mild restriction. In short,
when initial probability is small enough, higher risk-aversion leads to higher
self-protection efforts.
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) examine the relation between high degree of
risk averse-prudence, and optimal level of effort. They show a prudent agent,
whether risk-loving or risk-averse, will spend less in protection efforts than a
risk-neutral one does.
Meyer and Meyer (2011) use the procedure by Dimanod and Stiglitz to
study the impact on self-protection by changes in risk. This method not only
allows the findings to be generalized, and also study the self-protection activity
in a larger sense.
Hofmann and Peter (2015) extend the study on effect of risk preference
on self-insurance and self-protection to a two-period model. Their conclusions
is consistent with previous mono-periodic models, that increased risk aversion
induces higher self-insurance activities and higher self-protection activities when
initial probability for loss is small enough. When the model includes endogenous
savings, the agent with more concave utility function will always select more
self-insurance, will take more self-protection only when the probability of loss is
small enough. When there is no endogenous savings, the agent will take higher
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effort in either self-insurance or self-protection only if current consumption is
sufficiently large. In fact the two-period model separates the cost and benefits
of prevention efforts, which is relatively clear to understand the relation between
risk preference and prevention efforts.
1.2.2 Monotonic Comparative Statics
Comparative statics is a commonly used method in economics, which com-
pares different outcomes when there are changes in the parameters. In this
paper, we mainly use the monotonic comparative statics to solve optimization
problems.The major methods in this are the ’single crossing condition’ by Mil-
grom and Shannon (1994) and ’interval dominance order’ by Quah and Strulovi-
ci(2009).
Some early contributions in literature of monotone comparative statics are
by Milgrom and Roberts(1990), Vives(1990)and Topkis(1998).
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) characterize the single crossing condition and
demonstrate its application to several settings, such as competitive firm, the
Bertrand oligopolistist and so on.
Quah and Strulovici(2009) identify the interval dominance, which comple-
ment the application of comparative statics when single crossing property is
violated.
8
1.3 Contributions of This Thesis
My study offers a new condition for positive relation between risk-aversion
and self-insurance-cum-protection activities and we try to extend this condition
to self-insurance and self-protection model.
Firstly, we resort to a new method-interval dominance order, to conduct
comparative statics of risk aversion and optimal prevention activities. This
method has been applied to study background risk, high order risk preference
and precautionary paying in previous literatures(Wang and Li 2015, Wang et al
2016). But there is no study using this method to focus on the risk preference
and prevention efforts.
Secondly, our study extend the effectiveness of previous results(Dionne and
Eeckhoudt 1985, Lee 1998, Jullien et al 1999). Our finding is valid even when
optimal solution for SICP or self-insurance activity is corner solution or inflection
point solution.
Unlike the previous literature on risk aversion and self-protection using the
first order condition, whose conclusion requires a threshold for initial probability
of loss and second order condition for utility function, results for our study
requires one assumption about the relation between hazard rate and boldness
coefficient.In this way, our study releases assumptions in previous literature.
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Chapter 2 Methodology and model setting
2.1 Review of Concepts
To compare two sets,Topkis(1998)defines an order of sets.
Definition 2.1.1 Let S
′
and S
′′
be two subsets of R. S
′′
dominates S
′
in
the strong set order (S
′′ ≥SSO S ′)if for any x′′ ∈ S ′′ and x′ ∈ S ′,we have
max{x′′ , x′} ∈ S ′′ and min{x′′ , x′} ∈ S ′.
Milgrom and Shannon(1994)propose the single crossing property.
Definition 2.1.2 Let S
′
and S
′′
be two subsets of R. S
′′
dominates S
′
in the
strong order set (S
′′ ≥SSO)S ′if for any x′′ ∈ S ′′ and x′ ∈ S ′,we have max{x′′, x′} ∈
S ′′ and min{x′′, x′} ∈ S ′.
Definition 2.1.3 The family {f(x, s)}s∈S obeys single crossing property if for
all x
′′
> x
′
and s
′′
> s
′
f(x
′′
, s
′
)− f(x′ , s′)⇒ f(x′′ , s′′)− f(x′ , s′′).
Define ∆(s) = f(x
′′
, s)−f(x′ , s), then ∆(s) is an increasing function and crosses
x-axis only once under the condition of single crossing.
Single crossing property is useful in comparing the optimal solutions in
some situations.
Theorem 2.1.4 The family {f(x, s)}s∈S obeys single crossing difference if and
only if argmaxx∈Y f(x, s) is increasing in s in the sense of ≥SSO for all Y ⊆ R.
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In some cases, single crossing property is not effective. Quah and Strulovi-
ci(2009) propose the interval dominance order.
Definition 2.1.5 let X ⊆ R. The set Y ⊆ X is an interval of X if, whenever
x′ and x′′ are in X, then any x ∈ X such that x′ ≤ x ≤ x′′ is also in Y .
The family {f(x, s)}s∈S obeys the interval dominance order if for any x′′ > x′
and s
′′
> s
′
such that f(x
′′
, s
′
)− f(x, s′) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [x′, x′′], we have
f(x
′′
, s
′
)− f(x′ , s′)⇒ f(x′′ , s′′)− f(x′ , s′′).
Theorem 2.1.6 The family {f(x, s)}s∈S obeys obeys the interval dominance
order if and only if argmaxx∈Y f(x, s) is increasing in s all intervals Y ⊆ X.
Quah and Strulovici(2009)also provide a simple way of checking that a family
obeys the interval dominance order.
Theorem 2.1.7 Suppose X is a interval of R, the functions f , g: X → R are
absolutely continuous on compact intervals in X. If there is an increasing and
strictly positive function α : X → R such that g′(x) ≥ α(x)f ′(x) for all x, then
g dominates f by the interval dominance order.
2.2 The models
Consider an individual with an initial wealth w0 is facing an event with po-
tential risk. Let p ∈ [0, 1] defines the probability of risk happens and (1− p) is
the state when risk does not happen.Assume this individual has von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u, and utility function is differentiable and strictly
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increasing (u
′
> 0). The individual can engage in self-insurance activities to
reduce the potential losses of the accident, self-protection activities to guarantee
a better chance of accidents do not happen and self-insurance-cum-protection
activities to reduce the size and probability of losses at the same time.The deci-
sion maker’s effort in self-insurance or self-protection is equal to or smaller than
his initial wealth.
We will first consider self-insurance activities and self-protection activities sep-
arately, then we study SICP model.
2.2.1 Self-Insurance
Assume an individual’s level of self-insurance is x and his self-insurance
is within the interval [0, w0] .Monetary cost for self-insurance activity is c(x)
and increasing marginal cost indicates c
′
(x) > 0.Potential loss is reduced by
self-insurance activities, thus losses is a function of level of self-insurance l(x).
Because marginal effect of self-insurance is decreasing,l
′
(·) < 0 holds.
The expected utility function for an individual u can be put:
U(x) = pu(w0 − c(x)− l(x)) + (1− p)u(w0 − c(x))
Assume another individual v is more risk-averse than u and his expected utility
can be represented by a concave transformation k(u)(k
′
(·) > 0, k′′(·) < 0) of u’s
12
expected utility.
pv(w0 − c(x)− l(x)) + (1− p)v(w0 − c(x))
= pk(u((w0 − c(x)− l(x))) + (1− p)k(u(w0 − c(x)))
Let xu and xv represent the optimal self-insurance level for u and v.
In Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985)’s paper, they show that to guarantee the opti-
mal self-insurance level for u is positive (xu > 0), we need
−l′(x)− c′(x) > 0
which suggests the marginal effect on risk of self-insurance must be larger than
its marginal cost.
Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985) resort to first order condition to show v takes
higher self-insurance activities than u does and finds v’s marginal utility is larger
than zero at the optimal self-insurance level(xu) for u. The FOC of v is:
−pv′(w0 − c(xu)− l(xu))(c′(xu) + l′(xu))− (1− p)v(w0 − c(xu))c′(xu) > 0
This can be put:
− pk′(u(w0 − c(x)− l(x)))u′(w0 − c(xu)− l(xu))(c′(xu) + l′(xu))
− (1− p)k′(u(w0 − c(x)))u′(w0 − c(xu))c′(xu) > 0 (2.1)
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Compare with the FOC for u, (2.1) is positive when the coefficient for u’s
marginal utility when loss happens is larger than that for u’s marginal utili-
ty when no loss happens. Hence,
k
′
(u(w0 − c(x)− l(x))) > k′(u(w0 − c(x)))
This holds because k
′′
(·) < 0 and u′(·) > 0.
A major limitation for Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985)’s conclusion is they
require the first order derivatives of U(x) and V (x) are monotonic (U
′′
(x) <
0, V
′′
(x) < 0).
However, if the first order derivative is not monotonic, −pv′(w0 − c(xu) −
l(xu))(c
′
(xu)+ l
′
(xu))− (1−p)v(w0−c(xu))c′(xu) > 0 does not guarantee higher
optimal care for v (xv > xu).
Here, we resort to single crossing condition, which is still effective when
monotonicity of first order condition is released. Our proposition is
Proposition 2.2.1 If v is more risk averse than u in Arrow-Pratt sense,regardless
of u’s preference towards risk (u
′′
(·) = 0, > 0, < 0),v will exert more self-
insurance than u do.
Proof For the sake of convenience, define A = w0−c(x)−l(x) andB = w0−c(x).
U(x), V (x) are both in the family {W (x)}. Because v(x) can be gained by an
increasing concave transformation k(x)(k
′
(x) > 0) of u(x) (v(x) = k(u(x))).
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According to Theorem 2.1.4, if {W (x)} obeys single crossing property, then
argmaxx∈R+V (x) ≥SSO argmaxx∈R+U(x)
holds.Based on Definition 2.1.3
{W (x)} obeys single crossing property
⇔
U(x′′)− U(x′) ≥ (>)0⇒ V (x′′)− V (x′) ≥ (>)0. (2.2)
A sufficient condition for (2.2) is
U(x) is increasing with x ⇒ V(x) is increasing with x. (2.3)
Note that
U(x) is increasing with x
⇔ −pu′(A)(c′(x) + l′(x))− (1− p)u′(B)c′(x) ≥ (>)0 (2.4)
and
V(x) is increasing with x
⇔ −pv′(A)(c′(x) + l′(x))− (1− p)v′(B)c′(x) ≥ (>)0 (2.5)
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From v(x) = k(u(x)), we have
−pv′(A)(c′(x) + l′(x))− (1− p)v′(B)c′(x) ≥ (>)0
⇔ −pk′(u(A))u′(A)(c′(x) + l′(x))− (1− p)k′(u(B))u′(B)c′(x) ≥ (>)0
⇔ k′(u(A))[−pu′(A)(c′(x) + l′(x))
−(1− p)k
′
(u(B))
k′(u(A))
u
′
(B)c
′
(x)] ≥ (>)0 (2.6)
From k
′
(·) > 0, k′′(·) < 0 and u(A) < u(B), we obtain k
′
(u(B))
k′ (u(A)) < 1, which
implies
−pu′(A)(c′(x)+l′(x))−(1−p)k
′
(u(B))
k′(u(A))
u
′
(B)c
′
(x) ≥ −pu′(A)(c′(x)+l′(x))−(1−p)u′(B)c′(x)
Therefore (2.4) implies (2.5).
Q.E.D
An advantage of our result is:this conclusion is independent of the restric-
tions on second order derivatives of utility functions. Thus, this result extends
the effectiveness of conclusions by Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985)to the situations
where the optimal solutions are not inertial solutions.
2.2.2 Self-insurance-cum-protection model
The Self-insurance-cum-protection model (SICP) is formally studied by Lee
(1998). This model examines the case when one’s effort simultaneously influ-
ences both probability of risk and the size of loss. In practice, SICP model is
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more consistent with some real world examples. For example, those who wear
helmet while cycling are tend to be more cautious about their behavior than
those do not wear any protection. Thus they are less likely to suffer from the
accidents and exposure to lower probability of accidents. The helmet can reduce
the seriousness of potential injures. Given this, these cyclists exposure to both
lower probability of accidents and less potential injure. Another example can be
found with high quality brakes on viechles reduce the probability of an automo-
bile accident(such as ABS system can guarantee the viechle tractable in harsh
situations) and lower the magnitude of a loss if the viechle clashes another one.
The model is as following. The expected utility for two agents are:
U(x) = p(x)u(w0 − c(x)− l(x)) + (1− p(x))u(w0 − c(x))
V (x) = p(x)v(w0 − c(x)− l(x)) + (1− p(x))v(w0 − c(x))
Assume Agent v is more risk averse than U ,and the utility function for v can be
represented by a concave transformation of utility function for u,(v(x) = k(u(x)).
In our model, there is no assumptions on the second order derivative of u, which
implies the DM can be risk-averse, risk-neutral or even risk-loving. x is the
level of self-insurance-cum-protection (SICP) activities taken by the decision
maker. Let xu and xv represent the optimal SICP level for u and v respectively.
The probability and size of losses decrease by higher SICP activities. Thus,
p(x) ∈ [0, 1], p′(x) < 0 and l(x) > 0, l′(x) < 0. Monetary cost for SICP activites
is represented by c(x) and its marginal cost is increasing (c
′
(x) > 0).
17
Lee’s(1998) paper has studied the effect of an increase in risk aversion on
SICP activities and shows that the effect depends in part on the shape of the loss
function, relating the size of a potential loss to SICP expenditures. Particularly,
if the marginal reduction for a loss is larger than the marginal increase in the
cost of SICP expenditures, more risk-averse individuals invest more in SICP.
His proposition goes as follows.
Theorem 2.2.2 (Lee,1998)
1. Assume that, for a given risk-averse individual with the utility function
U, ∂EU
∂x
|x=0 > 0 and ∂EU∂x |x=w0 < 0 hold and hence an interior solution,
xu′ exists. Then, a sufficient condition for more risk-averse individual to
invest more in SICP is c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) ≤ 0.
2. Assume that, for a given risk-averse individual with the utility function
U, ∂EU
∂x
|x=0 > 0 and ∂EU∂x |x=w0 < 0 hold and hence an interior solution,
xu′ exists, and that c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) > 0.Then, there is some number p
∗
u ∈
(0, 1) such that more risk-averse individuals invest more(less) in SICP if
p(xu) < (>)p
∗
u.
In Lee(1998)’s proposition, he considers when mainly two different situations,
based on the sign of c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu). When c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) ≤ 0, the results is
much like that for self-insurance case. While c
′
(xu)+ l
′
(xu) > 0, some additional
assumptions are needed to guarantee relation between SICP and increased risk-
aversion, since the increase in probability of loss p will decrease DM’s benefit
from SICP activities.
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In our proposition, we suggest a new condition, which expand the effec-
tiveness of the relation in first situations (c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) ≤ 0) in Lee(1998)’s
paper.
Proposition 2.2.3 Assume agent v is more risk averse than u. The utility is
always positive for both agents. c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) ≤ 0. Under the condition that
hazard rate of the loss is higher than ’boldness’ coefficient of u in no risk state
( p
′(x)
1−p(x) ≥ −c′(x)u
′(w0−c(x))
u(w0−c(x)) ), v will take higher SICP efforts than u do.
Proof For convenience, let A = w0 − c(x)− l(x), B = w0 − c(x).
Define g(x) = k(x)− k′(x)x
g′(x) = k′(x)− k′′(x)x− k′(x) = −k′′(x)x ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0
Thus
g(u(A)) = k(u(A))− k′(u(A))u(A) < g(u(B)) = k(u(B))− k′(u(B))u(B)
The first order derivatives for two agents’ utility function are
U
′
(x) = p′(x)u(A)− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))u′(A)− p′(x)u(B)− (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)
V ′(x) = p′(x)v(A)− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))v′(A)− p′(x)v(B)− (1− p(x))c′(x)v′(B)
= p′(x)k(u(A))− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))k′(u(A))u′(A)
−p′(x)k(u(B))− (1− p(x))c′(x)k′(u(B))u′(B)
= p′(x){[k(u(A))− k′(u(A))u(A)]− [k(u(B))− k′(u(B))u(B)]}
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+k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))u′(A)]
−k′(u(B))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
≥ k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))u′(A)]
−k′(u(B))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
≥ k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)(c′(x) + l′(x))u′(A)]
−k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
= k′(u(A))U ′(x), (2.7)
The first inequality holds because p
′
(x) < 0 and [k(u(A))−k′(u(A))u(A)]−
[k(u(B)) − k′(u(B))u(B)] < 0.The secondly inequality holds if (k′(u(A)) −
k′(u(B))) ∗ [p′(x)u(B) + (1 − p(x))c′(x)u′(B)] > 0. Since k′′ < 0,k′(u(A)) −
k′(u(B)) > 0. However, conditions do not guarantee p′(x)u(B)+(1−p(x))c′(x)u′(B)
is positive. So we assume p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B) > 0.
Given the above (2.7) holds,
V (x) I U(x)
argmaxx∈R+V (x) ≥ argmaxx∈R+U(x)
More risk-averse decision maker will take higher SICP effort.
Q.E.D
The condition in this proposition can be put:
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p′(x)
1− p(x) ≥ −c
′(x)
u
′
(w0 − c(x))
u(w0 − c(x)) (2.8)
HR(x) ≥ boldness(x)
1 ≥ HR(p(x))FR(u(x)) > 0
The term of left side of first inequality is hazard rate, measures change in prob-
ability for risk when no risk happens at the current activity level. The term
of right side is the boldness rateand its inverse as fear of ruin( Aumann and
Kurz,1977)1,which indicates an agents willingness to risk all his fortune against
a small potential gain. This condition can be put in another way that the less
risk averse decision maker’s marginal decrease in probability to survival proba-
bility is higher than the marginal cost of utility to total utility.
With interval dominance order, our conclusion extends to the situation,
when second order derivative is not given or optimal solution is not interi-
or solution. Compare with Lee(1998)’s result, when c
′
(x) + l
′
(x) ≤ 0, our
method extend the effectiveness even when the optimal solution is not inte-
rior. In Lee(1998)’s proposition,the condition ∂EU
∂x
|x=0 > 0 and ∂EU∂x |x=w0 < 0
is required. With our method, this assumption is not necessary. The marginal
utility functions do not need to be monotonic on the interval [0, w0]. Given this,
the optimal solution maybe corner solution or inflection point solution. This is
more consistent with real world situations. For example, decision makers may
have psychological thresholds for protection activities. If they take higher pro-
1also see Foncel and Treich(2005)
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tection activities than this threshold in mind, their attitude towards risk may
change, such as turn risk neutral or even risk loving from risk averse.
In fact, the model of self-insurance and self-protection can be derived from
SICP model. If the probability of loss is independent of the activity level(p
′
=
0), this SICP model is reduced to self-insurance model. Our findings are still
effective under this circumstance. The marginal utility for u can be positive even
when −p′(x)u(B)− (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B) is negative. Because the absolute value
of marginal effect on loss is larger then that of marginal cost (c
′
(xu)+ l
′
(xu) ≤ 0)
is the implied condition in this model and, hence, u’s optimal self-insurance level
maybe positive. Single crossing condition suggests v takes higher self-insurance
even second order derivatives for u or v is not defined.
Interestingly, our finding fails to extend its effectiveness when loss is in-
dependent from protection activity and only probability is affected by self-
protection. Since size of loss is unrelated to the activity level(l
′
(·) = 0), the
model is reduced to self-protection model. However, our condition does not in-
dicate a clear result for self-protection. The problem lies in the marginal utility
of u is always negative. Because c
′
(xu) + l
′
(xu) = c
′
(xu) > 0 and sum of the
first two items in marginal utility for u is samller than zero. Additionally,our
condition assumes the sum of last two items in marginal utility of u is nega-
tive. Therefore,u’s utility decreases as he takes increasing level of self-protection
and his optimal protection level is zero, which is inconsistent with most cas-
es in real world. Even v’s marginal utility can be represented by a increasing
transformation of u’s, it can not guarantee v has positive marginal utility from
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self-protection. Some additional assumptions are needed to conclude this rela-
tion in this case.
2.2.3 A Brief Discussion for Self-Protection
In this part we consider self-protection case. Self-protection only increases
the probability of good outcome at the expense of decreasing the utility of all
states. Assume the level of self-protection is x,and x ∈ [0, w0]. The probability
of loss can be expressed as a function of self-protection level p(x) and p
′
(·) < 0
because the marginal effect of self-protection is decreasing. The monetary cost
c(x) and c
′
(·) > 0 for increasing marginal cost. Here, we assume self-protection
can only influence the probability of risk occurrence,while it does not affect the
severity of loss. The size of loss is independent of self-protection and represented
by a constant l, (l > 0).
The expected utility function for two decision makers are:
U(x) = p(x)u(w0 − c(x)− l) + (1− p(x))u(w0 − c(x))
V (x) = p(x)v(w0 − c(x)− l) + (1− p(x))v(w0 − c(x))
Let xu and xv represent the optimal self-protection level for u and v.
In Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985)’s paper, the conventional first order con-
dition does not suggest a clear comparison for the optimal self-protection level.
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Because the sign of
V ′(xu) = p′(xu)v(w0 − c(xu)− l)− p(xu)c′(xu)v′(w0 − c(xu)− l)
−p′(xu)v(w0 − c(xu))− (1− p(xu))c′(xu)v′(w0 − c(xu))
is not decided by k
′
(·) and k′′(·). This formula does not indicate the relation
between increased risk-aversion and self-protection. To find the relation between
xu and xv they discuss the value of k
′
(·).
Theorem 2.2.4 (Dionne and Eeckhoudt,1985)
1. k
′
> 1(< 1) everywhere in the interval [A,B] (they assume A = w0 −
c(x)− l(x), B = w0 − c(x)) implies that both the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of x increases (decreases) for v such that the net effect on x
is ambiguous.
2. k
′
> 1 at A,k
′
< 1 at B and k
′
= 1 at C with A < C < B. It is impossible
without more restrictive assumptions to predict the sign of the variation
both for the marginal benefit and for the marginal cost.
Dionne and Eeckhoudt(1985) also consider several concrete examples including
quadratic utility function, logarithmic utility function and exponential utility
function. They find that the the optiaml self-protection level for more risk
averse agent is higher (xv > xu) if p >
1
2
for quadratic utility functions, while
the relation is ambiguous with logarithmic type and exponential type.
Jullien and et al. (1999) suggested a more risk-averse agent will take higher
self-protection activities if and only if the probability of loss is lower than a
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threshold. The idea for Jullien et al(1999)’s proving is to find v’s first order
condition is positive with u’s optimal effort.
Theorem 2.2.5 (Jullien,Salanie and Salanie,1999)
Assume condition:
1. U is concave;c(x),c(x) + l are increasing convex;p(x) is decreasing convex
and p
′′
(x)p(x) ≥ 2p′(x);
2. The level of effort of u is stricly between 0 and w0.
hold for u and v, and v is more risk-averse than u. Then self-protection is
higher for v than for u if and only if the probability is smaller than a threshold
(p(eu) < p
∗).
p∗
1−p∗ = (
U
′
(B)∆V−V ′ (B)∆U
V ′ (A)∆U−U ′ (A)∆V )
c
′
(eu)
d′ (eu)
,
∆V = V (B)− V (A),∆U = U(B)− U(A)
A = W − d(eu), B = W − c(eu),
eu is the optimal self-protection level for agent u.
This results implies if the initial probability for loss is low enough, more risk-
averse decision maker will take higher self-protection activities.
We resort to interval dominance order and try to suggest a new condition,
which requires one assumption concerning fear of ruin coefficient and marginal
effect of self-protection on probability and marginal cost of self-protection. How-
ever, our result is not desirable. Our condition is theoretically practical. While
its economic intuition is unreasonable. Because based on our assumption, the
less risk averse DM always takes no self-protection activity since his marginal
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utility is always negative and taking self-protection activity decreases his utility.
For the more risk averse agent, his optimal level of prevention cannot be decided
since of the sign of his marginal utility from self-protection is unclear. Marginal
utility for v can be put as:
V ′(x) = p′(x)k(u(A))− p(x)c′(x)k′(u(A))u′(A)− p′(x)k(u(B))
−(1− p(x))c′(x)k′(u(B))u′(B)
= p′(x){[k(u(A))− k′(u(A))u(A)]− [k(u(B))− k′(u(B))u(B)]}
+k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)c′(x)u′(A)]
−k′(u(B))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
> k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)c′(x)u′(A)]
−k′(u(B))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
> k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(A)− p(x)c′(x)u′(A)]
−k′(u(A))[p′(x)u(B) + (1− p(x))c′(x)u′(B)]
= k′(u(A))U ′(x) (2.9)
However, the sign of V
′
(x) is not defined in this inequality. Because the
marginal utility for u is always negative, while the sign for v’s marginal utility
is not clear. Hence the more risk averse agent’s choice for self-protection can
not be determined by this method. We need more conditions to suggest a clear
relation between risk aversion and self-protection.
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Chapter 3 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I re-examine Dionne and Eechkdout(1985)’s topic on
risk aversion and self-insurance and self-protection activities and Lee(1998)’s
SICP model. With single crossing condition and interval dominace order,I con-
clude a new condition for the positive relation between risk aversion and SICP
activities. Additionally, we extend our results to self-protection (SICP) model.
Our method in this study has not been conducted in previous studies.
In this simple case of choice under low order risk, we show that increased
risk aversion will induce both self-insurance and SICP activities.The condition
for SICP requires property of hazard rate and fear of ruin coefficient. This study
still opens to further examination. For example, this model can be expanded to
a two-period model setting (Menegatti 2009,2011) and more general cases with
possibility of various states in form of density function. Moreover, comparative
statics for high order risk preference and prevention efforts is another interesting
topic. Furthermore, with single crossing condition and interval dominance order,
the comparative statics of relation between ambiguity aversion and precaution
actions is another potential research topic.
Now the model is restricted to the two-state model, namely only loss and
safe states. It is of great interest to investigate continuous states of nature and
the general type of distribution function. Furthermore, utility is bi-variate or
even multivariate function is not included, which can more effectively suggest
injurers and victims’ behavior and care level. The bivariate model can be applied
to diverse settings, such as risk aversion and contest. These extensions are my
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future research topics.
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